Crimes Against Public Order
NATURE OF THE CRIMES AGAINST PUBLIC ORDER & WHY IS IT PENALIZED
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Crimes against public order refer to acts that disturb the peace, security, and stability of the state. These crimes threaten the social and political order by undermining government authority, creating public unrest, or inciting rebellion or violence. The primary aim of penalizing these offenses is to maintain public peace and governmental stability, essential to the orderly functioning of society.
Crimes against public order are penalized because they:
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1. Threaten National Security: They challenge the government’s authority and can disrupt the operations of government institutions.
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2. Cause Public Disorder: These crimes may lead to chaos, riots, and widespread violence, putting citizens’ lives and property in danger.
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3. Undermine Social Stability: Acts like rebellion, sedition, and incitement weaken the rule of law, causing insecurity and distrust in government institutions.
Rebellion, Insurrection, and Coup d’État
Rebellion or insurrection (Article 134): is the rising up in arms against the government for the purpose of removing allegiance from the government or laws or for seizing any of its powers.
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Elements:
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1. The presence of an armed uprising.
• The offender must be engaged in a rebellion or insurrection, which involves the use of force or violence. This uprising can be against the government or the lawful authority.
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2. The purpose of the uprising is to remove the government or its authority.
• The goal of rebellion or insurrection is to either overthrow the government, deprive it of its lawful authority, or obstruct the execution of its laws.
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3. The rebellion or insurrection must be led by individuals or groups.
• Rebellion is often a collective effort, with participation from groups or individuals, and does not necessarily require that all participants are armed.
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4. The rebellion must be public and organized.
• Rebellion is not a secretive act but one that involves public action, often involving people gathering together to openly oppose government authority.
Coup d’État (Article 134-A): is defined as
“A swift attack accompanied by violence, intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth directed against duly constituted authorities of the Republic of the Philippines, or any military camp or installation, communications networks, public utilities, or other facilities needed for the exercise and continued possession of power by the government, and carried out by any person or persons, with or without civilian support or participation, for the purpose of seizing or diminishing state power.”
Elements:
1. Swift attack: The act is sudden and unexpected, meant to quickly destabilize or overthrow the government.
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2. Use of violence or threat: The attack involves the use of force, threat, or stealth to intimidate or overpower government forces or officials.
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3. Targeting government infrastructure or officials: The targets include government installations, communication networks, public utilities, or officials holding key positions of power.
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4. Purpose of seizing or diminishing power: The ultimate aim is to seize state power or reduce the ability of the government to exercise it.
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Penalties and Criminal Liability
Under RA 6968, penalties vary depending on the role of the participants:
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Leaders and masterminds: Those who lead or organize the coup are subject to
reclusion perpetua (life imprisonment).
Participants: Other individuals who take part in the coup may face imprisonment ranging from six (6) years to twelve (12) years.
Comparison with Other Political Crimes
Rebellion is a broad, armed uprising aimed at completely overthrowing the government, while a coup d’état is a swift, focused attack intended to quickly seize power. The key difference is that a coup is typically led by military members targeting key government structures, whereas rebellion involves a wider civilian movement and unfolds over a longer period.
Sedition, under Article 139 of the RPC, refers to the use of public disturbance or uprising to achieve political aims but without the specific aim of overthrowing the government.
People v. Hernandez, G.R. No. L-6025, July 18, 1956
The accused, Amado V. Hernandez, a prominent labor leader and political figure, was charged with rebellion complexed with other common crimes such as murder, arson, robbery, and kidnapping. The prosecution alleged that Hernandez, in leading a rebellion against the government, committed various criminal acts in furtherance of this political offense.
Hernandez argued that under the law, rebellion could not be complexed with common crimes because these criminal acts are considered inherent to the crime of rebellion itself. He claimed that his criminal acts were part of a political rebellion and should be punished only under the crime of rebellion, not separately for murder, arson, or robbery.
The Supreme Court ruled in favor of Hernandez, holding that rebellion cannot be complexed with other common crimes. The Court reasoned that rebellion is a political crime aimed at overthrowing the government and, as such, encompasses the commission of acts like murder, arson, and robbery if they are done in furtherance of rebellion. The Court emphasized that these acts are considered as mere ingredients or means to achieve the objective of rebellion, and therefore, cannot be charged separately.
In essence, the Court concluded that rebellion absorbs all other common crimes committed in pursuit of its goals, and thus, Hernandez could only be charged with rebellion, not rebellion complexed with murder or other offenses.
Legal Principles:
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1. Rebellion as a Political Offense: Rebellion is considered a political offense, defined under Article 134 of the Revised Penal Code, and is directed against the government.
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2. Inherent Acts: The Court ruled that acts such as murder, arson, robbery, and others, when committed as part of a rebellion, are absorbed by the crime of rebellion itself. The decision established the Hernandez Doctrine, which states that rebellion absorbs other crimes committed in furtherance of it, and they cannot be charged as separate offenses.
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3. No Complex Crime for Rebellion: Rebellion cannot be complexed with common crimes. These crimes are considered part of the rebellion, and only a single charge of rebellion can be brought against the accused.​
Sedition
Sedition (Article 139): is committed by rising publicly and tumultuously to attain an objective that is either political or social in nature, but not for removing allegiance to the government.
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Elements:
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1. The inciting of a rebellion, insurrection, or war.
• The act involves publicly inciting others to rise up against the government through rebellion, insurrection, or war, by means of speeches, writings, or other means of communication.
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2. The act must be committed with the intent to disturb or discredit the government.
• The purpose is to encourage or stir up civil unrest or disorder, with the intent to weaken or overthrow the government.
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3. The use of public acts or incitement.
• The incitement must be done publicly, either through speech, writing, publications, or other forms of communication, that are likely to incite others to engage in sedition or unlawful rebellion.
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4. The acts are committed by individuals or groups.
• Sedition can be committed by individuals or groups conspiring to cause rebellion or civil disorder against lawful authority.
The crime of sedition involves encouraging or inciting others to take violent actions or rise against the government through acts of public disturbance or rebellion.
People v. Evangelista, G.R. No. L-24203, September 17, 1926
The accused, Evangelista, was charged with sedition under Article 139 of the Revised Penal Code. He was accused of publicly inciting others to rise against the government and disturb its peace, advocating for the violent overthrow of the established government.
Evangelista’s actions included speeches and writings in which he encouraged his audience to rebel against the government and resist its authority. His speeches were designed to provoke rebellion or insurrection, aiming to disrupt the government and its operations. As a result of these actions, the government charged him with sedition.
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Ruling:
The Supreme Court affirmed the conviction of Evangelista for sedition. It held that the elements of sedition, as defined under Article 139 of the Revised Penal Code, were present in this case. Specifically, Evangelista’s acts of publicly inciting others to commit rebellion or insurrection with the intent to overthrow or disturb the government were deemed sufficient to constitute sedition.
The Court emphasized that sedition does not require the actual commission of a rebellion or insurrection, but rather, it is the incitement to rise against the government with the goal of weakening or overthrowing it. The Court ruled that Evangelista’s speeches and writings were a clear attempt to provoke rebellion, thereby meeting the elements of sedition.
Legal Principles:
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1. Sedition: The crime of sedition involves inciting others to rise against the government or to disturb its peace, with the aim of overthrowing or undermining its authority.
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2. Public Incitement: Incitement to rebellion, whether through speech, writing, or other means, can be considered sedition if it is intended to provoke unlawful acts against the government.
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3. No Need for Actual Rebellion: Sedition is a separate crime from rebellion, and actual rebellion is not required for a conviction of sedition. The mere incitement to commit rebellion or insurrection is sufficient.
Conspiracy and Proposal to Commit Rebellion or Sedition
Conspiracy and proposal to commit rebellion or coup d’état (Article 136): are separate crimes from the act itself. The mere agreement to commit rebellion or the proposal to others is punishable.
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Elements: Conspiracy to Commit Rebellion or Sedition (Article 136)
1. Two or more persons come to an agreement to commit rebellion or sedition.
2. They decide to commit the crime.
3. They commit acts to carry out their purpose (though actual rebellion or sedition may not yet have commenced).
Elements: Proposal to Commit Rebellion or Sedition (Article 136)
1. A person proposes to another the execution of the crime of rebellion or sedition.
2. The proposal is made with the intent to incite the other person to agree to commit rebellion or sedition.
Key Points:
• In conspiracy, there is already an agreement between two or more persons to commit rebellion or sedition.
• In proposal, only one person proposes to another, but no agreement has been reached yet.
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Kapunan, Jr., et al. v. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. Nos. 148213-17March 13, 2009
The case involves several military officers, including Brigadier General Kapunan Jr., who were implicated in an alleged conspiracy to overthrow the Philippine government during the administration of President Fidel V. Ramos. The military officers were charged with rebellion under the Revised Penal Code. The prosecution claimed that these officers conspired to commit rebellion by planning to engage in armed conflict against the government and by mobilizing forces to take control of key government facilities.
The accused officers denied the allegations, claiming there was no sufficient evidence to prove their participation in the conspiracy. They argued that mere association with individuals involved in rebellion or sedition does not constitute a crime without direct participation in the planning or execution of a rebellion or seditious acts.
The Court of Appeals upheld the indictment, leading the petitioners to elevate the case to the Supreme Court, challenging the sufficiency of the evidence and the applicability of the charges of conspiracy and proposal to commit rebellion or sedition.
Issue:
Whether the petitioners’ actions constituted conspiracy or proposal to commit rebellion or sedition, and if the evidence was sufficient to sustain the charges.
Ruling:
The Supreme Court ruled that while the petitioners were military officers allegedly involved in a movement against the government, the prosecution failed to provide conclusive evidence of their direct participation in the conspiracy or proposal to commit rebellion or sedition. The Court emphasized that for a conspiracy charge to prosper, there must be clear proof of an agreement to commit rebellion, coupled with overt acts to further the rebellion.
The Court held that the prosecution’s evidence only demonstrated indirect involvement or association, but not the required active participation or direct engagement in acts of rebellion or sedition. The charges were ultimately dismissed due to insufficiency of evidence.
Ratio Decidendi:
The Court underscored that conspiracy to commit rebellion or sedition must be supported by clear and convincing evidence of an agreement to rise in arms against the government, accompanied by actual steps to implement the rebellion. Mere association or presence during meetings where rebellion was discussed is not enough to convict someone of conspiracy. The ruling highlights that participation in a conspiracy must involve both intent and an overt act that demonstrates a commitment to achieve the unlawful objective.
The Supreme Court ruled that the charges of conspiracy and proposal to commit rebellion or sedition must be based on concrete actions that show the accused were not merely passive participants but actively engaged in plotting and executing the rebellion. Without such evidence, mere suspicion or association with rebels does not satisfy the elements of the crime.
Key Points on Conspiracy and Proposal to Commit Rebellion or Sedition:
• Conspiracy requires an agreement to commit rebellion or sedition and the execution of overt acts in furtherance of that agreement.
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• Mere association or indirect involvement in discussions about rebellion does not automatically amount to conspiracy.
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• Proposal to commit rebellion or sedition entails an offer or suggestion to engage in these crimes, which must be acted upon to be punishable.
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Inciting to Rebellion or Sedition
Inciting to rebellion or sedition (Article 142): refers to any person who, without taking part in the crime of rebellion or sedition, incites others to commit rebellion or sedition by speeches, writings, or publications.
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Elements: Inciting to Rebellion or Insurrection (Article 138)
1. The offender does not take a direct part in the rebellion or insurrection.
2. The offender incites others to the execution of any of the acts of rebellion or insurrection.
3. The inciting is done by speeches, proclamations, writings, emblems, cartoons, or any other means of representation that serve to incite or stir up rebellion.
Inciting to Sedition (Article 142)
1. The offender does not take a direct part in the sedition.
2. The offender incites others to the execution of any of the acts of sedition.
3. The inciting is done by means of speeches, proclamations, writings, emblems, cartoons, banners, or other representations that stir up the people to commit sedition.
4. The purpose is to prevent the execution of laws or disrupt public peace by instigating the people to rise publicly and tumultuously.
Key Points:
• The crime of inciting involves provoking others to commit rebellion or sedition, even if the offender does not participate in the actual rebellion or sedition.
• Means of incitement include any form of communication or representation intended to provoke action.
Espuelas v. People, G.R. No. L-2990, November 8, 1950
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Felipe Espuelas was a mayoral candidate who lost in the elections. Frustrated by his loss, Espuelas delivered several speeches to the public, inciting people to rise against the government. He urged them to arm themselves and use force to overthrow the newly elected officials, stating that the elections were fraudulent. He was charged with inciting to rebellion under Article 138 of the Revised Penal Code. Espuelas argued that his speeches were merely expressions of dissatisfaction with the elections and did not amount to inciting rebellion.
Issue: Whether Espuelas’ speeches constituted the crime of inciting to rebellion under Article 138 of the Revised Penal Code.
Ruling: The Supreme Court found Espuelas guilty of inciting to rebellion. The Court ruled that his speeches were clear incitements to violence and rebellion. His call for the people to take up arms and use force against the government went beyond the limits of free speech and constituted incitement to rebellion.
Key points:
1. Inciting to rebellion or insurrection consists of urging people to engage in a rebellion or an insurrection against the government, whether through speeches, writings, or other means of communication.
2. The act of encouraging or inciting others to use force or violence against the government is a punishable offense under Article 138 of the Revised Penal Code.
3. The Court emphasized that freedom of speech has its limits; when speech crosses the line into incitement to violence or rebellion, it becomes a criminal act.
In this case, the speeches of Espuelas were not protected by the constitutional right to free speech, as they explicitly encouraged the overthrow of the government through illegal means.
Disposition:
The conviction of Felipe Espuelas for inciting to rebellion was affirmed by the Court.
Ruling: The Court held that public speeches aimed at inciting the people to overthrow the government constituted inciting to rebellion, even if no actual rebellion occurred.
Illegal Assemblies
Illegal Assemblies (Article 146): are any meeting attended by armed persons for the purpose of committing any of the crimes punishable under the RPC or any meeting where participants are incited to commit treason, rebellion, or sedition.
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Elements:
1. There is a meeting or gathering of persons – A group of individuals must come together for a certain purpose.
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2. The meeting is for the purpose of committing a crime or advocating unlawful means to attain a lawful objective – There are two types of illegal assembly:
• A meeting with the purpose of committing a crime (e.g., a gathering to plan or commit robbery or any other unlawful act).
• A meeting for advocating or inciting the use of violence, force, or illegal means to achieve a lawful objective (e.g., using violence to demand changes in government policies).
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3. The meeting is attended by armed persons (for the first type of illegal assembly) – If the meeting is aimed at committing a crime, it must be attended by armed individuals to qualify as an illegal assembly.
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4. Knowledge of the illegal purpose – The person must knowingly participate in or be present at the gathering with an understanding of its illegal purpose.
In summary, an illegal assembly requires the gathering of people with the intent to commit unlawful acts or to incite others to achieve lawful goals through illegal means. If the purpose of the gathering is to commit a crime, it must also involve armed individuals.
Planas, et al. v. Commission on Elections, et al., G.R. No. L-35925, January 22, 1973
Petitioners filed a case against the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) challenging the constitutionality of Presidential Decree No. 73, which called for a plebiscite to ratify the 1973 Constitution. Petitioners argued that political assemblies or gatherings held to discuss the decree should not be prohibited, and they contended that their rights to free speech and assembly were being curtailed by government-imposed restrictions.
Issue:
Whether the prohibition of public assemblies or gatherings related to the plebiscite under Presidential Decree No. 73 was unconstitutional, and if such gatherings could be deemed illegal assemblies under the law.
Ruling:
The Supreme Court ruled in favor of the respondents. It upheld the constitutionality of Presidential Decree No. 73, stating that the plebiscite was essential for the ratification of the new Constitution. The Court did not find that the government’s restrictions on public gatherings or assemblies constituted a violation of free speech or assembly rights. Instead, it viewed these restrictions as necessary measures to ensure the orderly conduct of the plebiscite.
Ratio Decidendi:
The Court reasoned that while the right to free speech and peaceful assembly is guaranteed by the Constitution, it is not absolute. In times of national importance, such as the ratification of a Constitution, the state has a duty to maintain public order and ensure the peaceful and efficient execution of democratic processes. The restrictions on assemblies were therefore lawful and did not amount to the criminalization of political gatherings or illegal assemblies under the Revised Penal Code.
Key Points on Illegal Assemblies:
The case highlights the distinction between lawful public gatherings for political expression and illegal assemblies. Illegal assemblies are those formed with the purpose of committing a crime, while lawful political gatherings are protected by constitutional rights but can be subject to state regulation for public safety and order. In this case, the government’s regulation of public assemblies related to the plebiscite was considered lawful and not a violation of the freedom of assembly.
Illegal Associations
Illegal Associations (Article 147): are associations organized for the purpose of committing any of the crimes punishable under the Code or for inciting to the commission of crimes.
Elements:
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1. An association or organization exists – A group or body of persons has formed an organization or association.
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2. The purpose of the association is unlawful – The group’s primary objective is to engage in illegal activities, such as committing crimes or advocating for the use of violence or illegal means to attain goals, whether legal or illegal.
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3. The association is maintained for an unlawful purpose – The group’s existence and continued operations aim to carry out or promote its unlawful objectives.
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4. Participation of individuals – Persons become members of or take part in the activities of the illegal association, knowing its unlawful purpose.
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Calleja, et al. v. Executive Secretary, et al., G.R. No. 252578, December 07, 2021
Several petitioners, including Howard M. Calleja, filed petitions challenging the constitutionality of the Anti-Terrorism Act of 2020 (Republic Act No. 11479). They argued that certain provisions of the law, particularly those related to defining terrorism, membership in terrorist organizations, and related punishments, could be used to target legitimate organizations and associations, potentially violating the rights to free speech, peaceful assembly, and association.
The petitioners contended that the broad definitions under the law could lead to an arbitrary designation of individuals or groups as terrorists or members of illegal associations. They also claimed that the provisions on “terrorist associations” were too vague and overbroad, criminalizing mere membership in organizations without sufficient due process.
Issue:
Whether the provisions of the Anti-Terrorism Act that penalize membership in so-called “terrorist associations” are unconstitutional for being vague and overbroad, thereby infringing on the rights to free speech, assembly, and association.
Ruling:
The Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of most provisions of the Anti-Terrorism Act, including those related to the criminalization of membership in terrorist organizations. However, the Court struck down certain provisions, including a portion of Section 4 that criminalized acts not intended to cause harm but could be considered terroristic based on government interpretation.
Ratio Decidendi:
The Court ruled that while the state has a compelling interest in national security and can take action against groups involved in terrorism, the law must be clear and not infringe on fundamental rights. The Court emphasized that laws penalizing associations must strictly define what constitutes illegal association to avoid targeting legitimate organizations engaged in peaceful and lawful activities. The provisions relating to terrorist organizations were not deemed unconstitutionally vague, but they must be applied with caution to avoid abuse or the arbitrary designation of groups as illegal associations.
Key Points on Illegal Associations:
The case addressed the concept of illegal associations under the Anti-Terrorism Act, where mere membership in a designated terrorist organization could lead to criminal liability. The Court’s ruling reinforced that criminalizing membership in such organizations must be based on clear evidence of intent or involvement in unlawful activities, ensuring that legitimate organizations are not unjustly targeted.
This ruling highlights the balance between national security and the protection of civil liberties, particularly the right to free association, and the requirement that laws penalizing associations must be narrowly tailored to avoid infringing on constitutionally protected rights.
Disloyalty of Public Officers
Disloyalty of public officers (Article 137): is committed by public officers or employees who failed to resist a rebellion or sedition, or continue discharging public duties under the control of rebels or seditionists.
Elements:
1. The offender must be a public officer or employee. This element refers to any individual holding a government position, whether appointed or elected, or any employee in the service of the government.
2. The public officer must betray the public trust and disobey the lawful orders of the government. Disloyalty occurs when a public officer either acts in a manner that undermines the authority or security of the government or fails to adhere to lawful commands that serve the interests of the state.
3. The public officer must cooperate with foreign enemies or engage in activities contrary to the government’s interests. This involves collaborating or associating with external forces, groups, or persons that aim to overthrow or harm the government.
The offense punishes a public officer who, through their actions or negligence, engages in conduct that undermines the government’s authority or betrays the trust placed in them by the people.
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Ponce Enrile v. Salazar, G.R. No. L-69614, April 19, 1985 addressed the issue of disloyalty of public officers under Article 137 of the Revised Penal Code, which criminalizes the betrayal of public office by a government official or employee. The case involved accusations of disloyalty against the petitioner, who was a public officer at the time, for allegedly collaborating with external forces that were opposed to the government.
The Court ruled that disloyalty occurs when a public officer acts contrary to the interests of the government and the public trust by engaging in activities that undermine the state’s authority or security.
The ruling emphasized that disloyalty by a public officer is a serious breach of duty, as it is not only a violation of the trust placed in them by the government but also endangers the stability of the state. The decision reinforced the principle that public officers must serve with fidelity and integrity, and any action that aligns them with forces detrimental to the government constitutes a grave offense.
Direct Assaults
Direct assaults (Article 148): refer to attacking, employing force, or seriously intimidating persons in authority or their agents while they are in the performance of their duties or on occasion of such performance.
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Who are considered persons in authority: In applying the provisions of Articles 148 and 151 of the RPC, teachers, professors, and persons charged with the supervision of public or duly recognized private schools, colleges and universities, and lawyers in the actual performance of their professional duties or on the occasion of such performance, shall be deemed persons in authority. (As amended by P.D. No. 299, September 19, 1973 and Batas Pambansa Blg. 873, June 12, 1985).
A careful reading of the last paragraph of Article 152 will show that while a teacher or professor of a public or recognized private school is deemed to be a "person in authority," such teacher or professor is so deemed only for purposes ofthe application of Articles 148 (direct assault upon a person in authority), and 151 (resistance and disobedience to a person in authority or the agents of such person) of the Revised Penal Code.
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Elements:
1. The offender employs physical force.
• This means that the offender uses force, whether violent or aggressive, directly against the person of the official or agent of the government.
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2. The victim is a person in authority or their agent.
• The person assaulted must be a person in authority (such as a public officer or government official) or someone acting under the authority of the government (like a law enforcement officer, soldier, or government employee).
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3. The assault is committed in the performance of their official duties.
• The act of assault must occur while the person in authority or their agent is performing their lawful duties. This implies that the assault is directly related to their exercise of authority.
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4. The offender must have knowledge that the person being assaulted is a person in authority or an agent of such authority.
• The offender must be aware that the person being attacked holds a position of authority or is acting under such authority.
These elements outline the crime of direct assault, which involves the use of physical violence or force against public officials while they are discharging their duties.
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In Celso Pablo v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 231267, February 13, 2023, the Supreme Court upheld the conviction of the petitioner for direct assault under Article 148 of the Revised Penal Code. The ruling emphasized that direct assault occurs when a person uses force or intimidation to prevent a person in authority or their agent from performing their duties.
In this case, the petitioner physically attacked a police officer while the officer was performing his official duty. The Court reaffirmed that the law protects persons in authority and their agents from any act of resistance, hostility, or violence, considering that direct assault aims to disrupt the enforcement of public duty and maintain public order. The decision underscored that the act of attacking a person in authority constitutes direct assault even when the resistance is not necessarily violent but obstructs official duties.
Indirect Assault
Indirect assault (Article 149): is committed when any person makes an assault upon a person who comes to the aid of an authority or its agents during the commission of direct assault.
Elements:
1. A person in authority or their agent is the victim – The crime involves an agent of a person in authority, such as a police officer or any public servant, performing their official duties. The direct attack must be against this agent while they are carrying out their duties.
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2. A person in authority is being assaulted or seriously disobeyed – The main scenario involves an individual directly assaulting or seriously disobeying a person in authority (e.g., a mayor, judge, or police officer in the lawful performance of their duty).
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3. The offender assaults the agent who comes to the aid of the person in authority – The person guilty of indirect assault is someone who, while the agent of the authority is attempting to defend, assist, or rescue the person in authority from an assault or serious disobedience, attacks the agent.
Thus, indirect assault happens when a person who is not involved in the original disobedience or attack on the person in authority assaults the agent attempting to assist or intervene.
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In Lagrimas v. Director of Prisons, G.R. No. 38046, September 24, 1932 applies indirect assault under Article 149 of the RPC.
In this case, the petitioner Lagrimas was convicted of indirect assault for attacking a person who was aiding a person in authority during the commission of a crime. The facts established that during an incident, a person in authority (a local official) was being assaulted. Another individual, an agent of that authority, intervened to assist, and Lagrimas, instead of respecting the intervention, assaulted the agent, resulting in the charge of indirect assault.
The Supreme Court ruling in this case focused on the principle that indirect assault occurs when a person assaults an agent who comes to the aid of or defends a person in authority during an assault or serious disobedience. The ruling clarified that the law protects not only direct attacks on persons in authority but also indirect assaults through attacks on their agents or those acting on their behalf in the lawful execution of their duties.
The Court upheld the conviction under Article 149 of the Revised Penal Code, emphasizing that indirect assault is punishable to maintain the respect and authority of both public officials and their agents in the performance of their duties. The decision reiterated that the crime of indirect assault serves to protect public order and ensure that individuals performing their lawful duties are not obstructed or attacked.
Resistance and Disobedience
Resistance or serious disobedience (Article 151): to a person in authority or their agents is punishable when such resistance or disobedience is directed at lawful orders.
Elements for Resistance:
1. A person in authority or their agent is performing their official duties or giving a lawful order.
2. The offender resists or seriously disobeys the official, using force or violence in the process.
Elements for Serious Disobedience:
1. A person in authority or their agent is engaged in performing their duties or giving a lawful order.
2. The offender seriously disobeys the lawful orders of the official or agent.
3. The disobedience is committed in a serious manner, indicating willful defiance.
In both cases, the person in authority or their agent must be acting within the scope of their duties, and the resistance or disobedience must be directed at the lawful exercise of their authority.
In Mallari v. People of the Philippines (G.R. No. 224679, February 12, 2020), the Supreme Court addressed the crime of resistance or serious disobedience under Article 151 of the Revised Penal Code. The Court’s ruling provided a ratio decidendi on key points related to the offense, focusing on the legal elements necessary to establish guilt.
Ruling:
1. Lawful Orders: The Court emphasized that for a person to be convicted of resistance or serious disobedience, the order or action from the person in authority or their agent must be lawful. The accused’s resistance or disobedience must have been directed toward an act that the person in authority or agent was lawfully authorized to carry out.
2. Nature of Resistance or Disobedience: The Court clarified that serious disobedience must involve a degree of defiance that obstructs the person in authority or their agent from performing their duties. The disobedience must be more than mere verbal refusal; it must involve overt, serious actions that hinder law enforcement or the execution of lawful orders.
3. Context of Resistance: In Mallari’s case, the Court looked at whether the actions of the accused met the level of seriousness required by law. The Court found that to warrant a conviction, the accused’s actions must exhibit more than just ordinary resistance; they must involve clear resistance through force or violence, or serious obstruction of official functions.
As applied in Mallari’s Case: the evidence showed that the resistance displayed by Mallari met the threshold of serious disobedience as it was directed at law enforcement officers performing lawful duties, and his actions obstructed their lawful order, fulfilling the necessary elements of the crime under Article 151.